Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

10-27-2022

Eby v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Sep. 08,
2022)
Davit Sargsian

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Eby v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Sep. 08, 2022)1
NON-LAWYER AGENT THAT IS GRANTED POWER OF AUTHORITY CAN NOT
LITIGATE A CLAIM BELONGING TO THE PRINCIPAL, AND COURTS MUST APPLY
THE YOUNG FACTOR TEST TO IMPOSE CASE CONCLUDING SANCTIONS
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to strike the second
amended complaint and reversed the decision to dismiss the remaining malpractice claim with
prejudice. According to Nevada’s Uniform Power of Attorney Act, the Court held a non-lawyer
agent working under a power of attorney2 regarding claims and litigation could not litigate an
action pro se in place of the principal or engage in the practice of law on the principal’s behalf.
The trial court correctly held that the appellant’s non-lawyer agent under a power of attorney was
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The decision to dismiss the action with prejudice
after the appellant failed to timely file a proper amended complaint amounted to a sanction for
the appellant’s failure to comply with a court order.
Background
Appellant Donald Douglas Eby was sued by a victim to a related crime that Eby
committed against the victim. Eby retained respondents Johnston Law Office, P.C., Brad M.
Johnston, and LeAnn E. Schumann. Eby executed a power of attorney giving the respondents
authority to settle the case, which they did in October 2018. The case resulted in a settlement
amount of $500,000. In September 2020, Eby filed this action in pro se against the respondents,
asserting different causes of action, including legal malpractice. Later, Eby filed an amended
complaint adding claims and detailed allegations.
Additionally, Eby vaguely alleged that respondents forced him to sign the power of
attorney granting them the power to settle. The first two pleadings were only signed by Eby.
Respondents moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, arguing that Eby failed to state a
claim under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Eby opposed the motion, again in papers
signed only in his name.
Before the scheduled hearing on the motion to dismiss, Eby moved the court to allow
Theodore Stevens, an inmate serving a sentence, to appear at the hearing on Eby’s behalf. In the
motion, Eby stated that he relied on Steven’s assistance to prepare the legal filings, could not
argue the case alone, and required Steven’s assistance at the hearing. The district court issued a
written order denying the motion because Stevens was not a licensed attorney in the State of
Nevada and could not represent Eby because any representation would be the unauthorized
practice of law.
The district court then held the hearing on the respondents’ motion to dismiss, at which
Eby appeared on his behalf. Arguments followed by the parties, and the court ruled that it was
dismissing the first amended complaint in its entirety, except for Eby’s malpractice claim that he
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was forced to sign a power of attorney. The court granted Eby leave to amend to provide a more
definite statement on the power-of-attorney allegation. The court made clear if Eby failed to
amend the second complaint within 30 days that it would dismiss that action without prejudice.
The court also told Eby that he must prepare the pleadings himself or with an attorney, but
without Stevens’s help.
After the hearing, the court dismissed the first amended complaint with prejudice under
NRCP 12(b)(5), except for the malpractice claim. Eby was granted leave to amend to provide a
more definitive statement. With help from Stevens, Eby filed an objection to the written order
but did not challenge the ruling that dismissal for failure to comply with it would be prejudice.
Eby, helped by Stevens, filed a second amended complaint on the last day of the thirty days. The
pleading stated that Stevens would substitute as the plaintiff under a power of attorney. The
pleading was signed by Stevens in that capacity. The district court entered a written order
striking all documents written by Stevens because he was engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. The court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to comply with its prior order.
That was done before any response to the pleading was filed and without holding a hearing. The
appeal followed.
Discussion
There are two main issues before the Nevada Supreme Court. The first issue is whether a
non-lawyer agent who was granted authority over claims and litigation by a power of attorney
can litigate a claim belonging to the principal. Second is the issue of what test a court must use to
impose case-concluding sanctions.
An individual may not authorize a non-lawyer to litigate in pro se or practice law on their
behalf by a power of attorney
The appellant argues that Stevens could represent and litigate on his behalf because Eby
signed the limited power of attorney, giving Steven the authority. Eby argues that two statutes3
allow a principal to authorize an attorney-in-fact under a power of authority. The Court rejected
this argument relying on statutes and cases. The Court discussed NRS Chapter 162A and
Nevada’s Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA). The Court specifically reviewed
“[c]onstruction of authority generally” under NRS 162A.470.4 Within this statute, the Court
reviewed what “subject[s] described in NRS 162A.200 to 162A.600” should be considered. The
Court found the explanation in NRS 162A.560, which explains the agent’s authority.5 This
authority enumerates other powers granted to an agent.6 Finally, the Court agreed that UPOAA
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permits a principal to give significant authority over litigation of their causes of action to an
agent under power of attorney.
At any rate, the Court proceeded to prove that Nevada does not allow an unlawful person
to practice law in Nevada. First, the Court established that it is unlawful for a person to practice
law in Nevada unless that person is an active member of the State Bar.7 Second, the Court relied
on their previous decision in Guerin8 to explain that a non-attorney is not permitted by any rule
or statute to represent an individual. But an individual can represent themselves in court. The
Court further used In re Discipline of Lerner9, to explain that there is a prohibition on
unauthorized practice of law to ensure the public is provided attorneys that are competent, have
gone through the training, and must abide by the regulations and discipline.
The appellant agrees that Stevens was engaged in practicing law. Still, the appellant
claims that UPOAA allows a non-lawyer agent with power of attorney to step in the principal’s
shoes and proceed as a pro se for the principal. The Court disagreed with this as well. The Court
has not answered this specific issue about a non-attorney agent that could represent another
person, but this was answered in a similar issue in Martinez.10 In that case, the district court
determined that a non-attorney agent couldn’t represent a person claiming unemployment
benefits under a statute that allowed one to be represented by other authorized agent. Only a
licensed attorney can represent a person in a court of law.
The Court then focused on the power of attorney issue and used the Handley11 case. In
that case, a non-lawyer acting under a power of attorney represented the plaintiff in a civil action.
The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the power of attorney statute did
not circumvent NRS 7.285’s prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law. The Court agreed
with this decision.
The Court used a Californian case, Drake,12 to support their position. In Drake, the court
considered whether a recently adopted power of attorney act abrogated the statutory prohibition
against the practice of law by a person not admitted to the Bar. The court evaluated the broad
powers of an attorney-in-fact under a California code, which is similar to NRS 162A.560. The
plaintiff received power of attorney from two other individuals and attempted to appear in legal
proceedings on their behalf. The lower court rejected this, and the plaintiff attempted to get a
writ of mandate to allow him to appear. The court of appeals denied this petition because the
court determined that the power of attorney act has broad language but does not permit an
attorney-in-fact to engage in legal activities under a power of attorney.
Principals under a power of attorney can appear pro se, but an agent cannot do so on their
behalf. The Court went further by showing that if the court allowed the plaintiff’s argument, it
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would reach absurd results, such as sanctioning criminal conduct by allowing the unauthorized
practice of law. Further, the Court held that there is a distinction between an attorney-in-fact and
an attorney-at-law. Accordingly, the Court found Drake persuasive, adopted this similar
approach, and concluded that Stevens could not appear pro se on the appellant’s behalf; only the
appellant could.
The Court concluded that UPOAA allowed a principal to grant an agent the authority
over claims and litigation the principal would have as a client in an attorney-client relationship.
The district court erred by imposing a case-concluding sanction without conducting the
requisite analysis
The appellant argues that the district court’s dismissal was incorrect because it conflicted
with the court’s oral ruling at the hearing on the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The court said it
would dismiss the action without prejudice if Eby failed to file an amended complaint properly
within thirty days. Accordingly, the appellant contends that the district court intended to dismiss
the case with prejudice and that the Court should reverse the dismissal.
The Court disagreed with this argument because the appellant did not follow the written
order instructions, and the order stated it would dismiss the case with prejudice. The appellant
also failed to raise the issue before the district court and waived it. That said, the Court decided
to consider this issue on sua sponte to prevent a plain error because they are allowed to by case
law.13
The Court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the appellant’s last legal
malpractice claim with prejudice because the district court did not conduct the analysis required
for imposing concluding sanctions under the Young14 case. In Young, the Nevada Supreme Court
held that a heightened standard of review applies when the sanction is dismissed with prejudice.
Dismissal with prejudice is considered a harsh remedy only to be used in extreme situations
where a court must weigh the policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits. Young
requires trial courts to support every order of dismissal as a discovery sanction through a written
explanation of the court’s analysis through the Young factors: “the degree of willfulness of the
offending party, the extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser
sanction, . . . [and] the feasibility and fairness of alternative, less severe sanctions.” The Court
then provided multiple cases in which the district courts applied or failed to apply the Young
factor test to their analysis.
The Court analyzed the district court’s reason as to why they did not apply the Young
factor test and couldn’t determine exactly why it occurred. Otherwise, the Court determined that
the district court’s decision to dismiss the action with prejudice was a case-concluding sanction.
The Court does point out that NCRP 12(e) allows a court to strike a pleading or issue (word
missing here?) any other appropriate order if the court orders a more definite statement and the
order is not obeyed within the time the court sets. At the same time, it compared the order to the
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identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) as being sanctions for noncompliance with the
court’s orders. Even though NCRP 12(e) broadly offers dismissal for noncompliance in a certain
situation, the district court must apply the Young factor rule.
The Court concluded that the district court needed to support and explain its decision to
dismiss the action with prejudice through the Young factors. Thus, the Court reversed the district
court’s order dismissing the appellant’s malpractice claim with prejudice and remanded it for
further proceedings.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling in part. It explained that a non-lawyer agent
working under a power of attorney pursuant to Nevada’s Uniform Power of Attorney Act
regarding claims and litigation could not litigate an action in pro se in place of the principal or
engage in the practice of law on the principal’s behalf. Accordingly, the Court reversed and
remanded the decision to dismiss the action with prejudice after the appellant failed timely to file
a proper amended complaint. Hence, it amounted to a case concluding sanction for which the
district court must apply the Young factor test in explaining why it is dismissing with prejudice.

